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INTRODUCTION

The Institute’s governing Council has au
thorized a referendum on two proposed
AICPA Code of Professional Ethics amend
ments recommended for adoption by the
board of directors. The bylaws provide that
such amendments be submitted to all
members of the Institute for a vote by
mail ballot ninety or more days after
Council authorization of the referendum.
This booklet presents a background
statement, pro and con arguments apply
ing to the proposals, the board of direc
tors’ message to Council prior to the fall
1978 meeting, and an opinion and legal
memorandum from the Institute’s legal
counsel.
In order to become effective, the amend
ments must be approved by two-thirds of
the members voting. Your ballot will be
valid and counted only if received by
March 31, 1979. Votes will be secret, but
can be counted only if the authenticating
card is signed and returned with the
ballot. Unauthenticated ballots cannot be
counted.
Donald J. Schneeman
Secretary
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BACKGROUND

Over a year ago, in September 1977,
as a part of its overall response to de
mands from several quarters that the pro
fession update its standards, AICPA
Council authorized a mail ballot of the
membership to modify the advertising rule
that until then had prohibited seeking
clients by solicitation or advertising.
The modified rule, as drafted by the
AICPA Professional Ethics Executive Com
mittee and presented to Council at the 1977
meeting, provided that “ A member shall
not seek to obtain clients by advertising
or other forms of solicitation in a manner
that is false, misleading, or deceptive.”
The committee announced its intention to
interpret the rule to prohibit direct unin
vited solicitation because it often leads to
the making of ‘‘false, misleading, or de
ceptive” statements that cannot be moni
tored.
Council decided to include the inter
pretation in the body of the rule and so
added to the text drafted by the com
mittee the sentence ‘‘A direct uninvited
solicitation of a specific potential client is
prohibited.”
The revised text was submitted to the
membership early in 1978 and was adopted
by approval of 72.2 percent of the mem
bers voting.
Almost immediately, the ethics execu
tive committee was asked whether the pro
hibition against ‘‘direct uninvited solicita
tion” was limited to “ in-person” solicita
tion or included written solicitation tailormade to the recipient. After extensive
consideration, the committee has most re
cently interpreted the prohibition to apply
only to direct uninvited oral or in-person
solicitation.
Since May 1977, prior to the 1977 action
of Council, the Institute’s advertising,
solicitation, and encroachment rules have
been the subject of an inquiry by the
United States Department of Justice. The
department seems to agree that the por
tion of the new advertising rule that pro-
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hibits only “ false, misleading, or decep
tive’’ advertising conforms to existing law,
since it has raised no objection to that
portion.
However, the department challenges the
legality of both rule 401 (encroachment)
and that portion of rule 502 prohibiting
direct uninvited solicitation, since neither
one is limited by the “ false, misleading, or
deceptive” standard. Prior to the October
1978 Council meeting, the Justice Depart
ment staff had recommended that the de
partment initiate a complaint seeking to
have the prohibitions against encroach
ment and solicitation declared illegal and
removed from the code.
Legal counsel for the Institute advised
that the rule against encroachment seemed
too broad a restraint to survive an anti
trust attack and that it was unlikely the
ban on direct uninvited oral or in-person
solicitation could be successfully de
fended. In an antitrust case, each rule
would be regarded as a restraint on com
peting CPAs and would be tested for
whether or not it would be “ reasonable”
in the antitrust sense. Recent cases in
dicate that the rules would have to be
shown to advance competition to be con
sidered “ reasonable.” Legal counsel ad
vised that they were not aware of facts that
would sustain a defense that the rules were
“ reasonable.”
In the light of these circumstances,
Council overwhelmingly authorized a mail
ballot to repeal the encroachment rule,
and authorized a mail ballot to repeal the
prohibition against direct, uninvited solici
tation in rule 502 by a vote of 106 to 103.
Thereafter, to avoid any implication that
Council was recommending a favorable
vote of the membership on the proposed
change in rule 502, members of Council
requested a record of their feelings re
garding the rule 502 change. Their vote
was recorded as 130 against the proposed
change in rule 502 and 69 in favor of
the proposal. No similar expression of
opinion was requested regarding the pro
posed repeal of rule 401 (encroachment).
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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Text of Proposed Change (deletions in
dicated by strikeover):
Proposal 1: Repeal of Rule 401
(Encroachment)

Text of Rule to Be Repealed:
Ru le 401— Encroachment
A member shall not endeavor to provide a
person or entity with a professional service
which is currently provided by another pub
li c accountant except—
—He may respond to a request for a pro
posal to render services and may furnish
service to those who request it.—How
ever, if an audit client of another inde 
pendent public accountant requests a
member to provide professional- advice
on accounting or auditing matters in
connection with an expression of opin
ion on financial statements, the member
must first consult with the other accoun
tant to ascertain that the member is
aware of all the available relevant facts.
2. Where a member is required to express
an opinion on combined or consolidated
financial stateme nts which include a
subsidiary, branch, or other compone nt
audited by another independent public
accountant, he may insist on auditingany such component which in his judg
ment is necessary to warrant t he ex
p ression of his opinion.
A member who receives an engagement
for services by referral from another public
accountant shall not accept the client’s re
quest to extend his service beyond the
specific engagement without first notifying
t he referring accountant; nor shall he seek
to obtain any additional engagement from

Proposal 2: Repeal of That Portion of Rule
502 Relating to Direct Uninvited Solicitation
Rule 502— Advertising and Other Forms of
Solicitation
A member shall not seek to obtain clients
by advertising or other forms of solicitation
in a manner that is false, misleading, or
deceptive. A direct uninvited solicitation of
a specific potential client is prohibited.
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ARGUMENTS APPLYING TO BOTH
PROPOSALS
In Favor of the Proposals

If the rules are voluntarily repealed by the
membership, the Institute would be in a
position to discourage undesirable forms
of solicitation and encroachment, to issue
policy statements against such practices
as unprofessional, and to urge members’
professional discretion in practice develop
ment. This would permit flexibility in re
sponding to the needs of the public and
the profession.
There are occasions when the Institute
must “ stand and fight.” This is not one
of those occasions. The trend of the
law in this area is clear, and the present
state of the law pertaining to bans on
solicitation and encroachment as ex
pressed in the Institute’s code is such
that the prospects of a successful anti
trust defense are, at best, slim. Any
vigorous attempt to preserve the chal
lenged bans should be in the legislative,
not the judicial, arena.
It is difficult to evaluate how the public
would view a “ stand and fight” position
by the profession. Such a position might
be admired by some, but others would see
it as a wasteful effort by the profession
to preserve rules that interfere with the
offering of professional services and that
deny the public the perceived benefits of
open competition.
Although the focus has been on govern
mental pressure, a legal challenge to the
bans could also come from other quarters,
such as from a member disciplined for
having solicited or encroached.
In the event a lawsuit is brought under
the antitrust laws, even if the court does
not order the rules removed from the code,
the trend in recent decisions suggests that
the court would limit any solicitation or
encroachment rule to banning only that
which is “ false, misleading, or deceptive”
and would prohibit the Institute from ad10

vancing any policy against, or making any
statements against, other undesirable
forms of solicitation or encroachment.
The defense of an antitrust attack on
the rules would be costly in terms of both
legal fees and the time of those involved.
The proposed changes should be
adopted because many practitioners al
ready engage in various forms of solicita
tion. It would be more honest and fair to
all to make the changes and allow prac
titioners to decide how best to practice
their profession.
Adoption of the proposal would still
permit the profession to prohibit unde
sirable practice development activities,
since rule 502 would still ban “ false, mis
leading, or deceptive” advertising or solici
tation.
Against the Proposals

The time has come for the profession to
stand firm before the challenge of everincreasing governmental interference.
Members should be willing to pay what
ever the cost to maintain standards of
behavior that have been hallmarks of their
profession for many years. It would erode
the dignity of the profession to abandon
such standards voluntarily.
By making the proposed changes volun
tarily, the Institute would invite even more
governmental intervention in the profes
sion’s affairs.
Some members believe that, while there
has been an expression of intent, there
is no certainty that the government will, in
fact, make a formal antitrust challenge
and that the likelihood of such a chal
lenge would decrease if the profession’s
resolve is clear.
The present rules promote honorable
competition, but the amendment would
permit all forms of solicitation and en
croachment—so long as they are not
“ false, misleading, or deceptive.” This
11

would not be in the best interests of either
the profession or the public.
The Institute’s repeal of the bans in
question may cause many state CPA
societies to adopt their own such bans,
thus complicating the joint enforcement
program.
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A R G U M E N T S A PP LY IN G
S P E C IF IC A L LY TO
REPEA L OF RULE 401
(E N C R O A C H M E N T )
In Favor of the Proposal

The AICPA Professional Ethics Division
has long been on record as favoring repeal
of rule 401 because it is inconsistent with
rule 502, which permits advertising and
solicitation unless it is “ false, misleading,
or deceptive.”
The rule has not been enforced because
no definition of what constitutes encroach
ment has been developed, and complaints
have usually been brought under the ad
vertising and solicitation rule (rule 502).
The rule in its present form creates a
restraint of trade so broad that legal
counsel has advised it cannot be suc
cessfully defended as “ reasonable.” Thus,
its existence as a rule of conduct invites
antitrust attack that could involve other
rules.
The elements of the rule that can be
defended as “ reasonable” —those relating
to “ shopping for accounting principles”
and expressing opinions on consolidated
financial statements—are related to the
technical standards rules and can be
issued more properly as interpretations
thereunder.
Against the Proposal

There is no court decision that directly
points to a learned profession’s encroach
ment ban as unlawful on antitrust grounds;
therefore, the validity of the government’s
objection to the rule should be tested in
the courts, not just accepted through
voluntary action by the profession.
Portions of the rule offer useful guid
ance to members, and that guidance might
be less effective if such portions were to be
published as a part of the profession’s
technical literature.
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A R G U M E N T S A P P LY IN G
SP E C IF IC A L LY TO REPEAL OF
D IR EC T U N IN V IT E D S O L IC IT A T IO N
BAN IN RULE 502

In Favor of the Proposal

The challenged portion of the rule most
recently has been interpreted to prohibit
only oral or in-person solicitation, and the
AICPA Professional Ethics Division intends
to amend its published interpretations to
reflect this conclusion. This ban is so
narrow that little would be lost by giving
it up voluntarily, just as little would be
gained in a costly fight to preserve it,
even in the unlikely event of success.
As a practical matter, the rule is unen
forceable. The only parties usually present
at a solicitation are the CPA and the pros
pective client; thus, typically there often
is no evidence to support a disciplinary
proceeding. Usually, clients do not want to
be involved if the solicitation has been un
successful; if it has been successful, they
will not testify against their accountants.
The only credible public policy argu
ment for retaining the ban would be that,
in the view of some, solicitation tends to
impair independence. Even if that argu
ment were accepted by a court with
respect to audit engagements, it is unlikely
that the ban could be justified with respect
to other professional services. Thus, a
large segment of professional practice
would not be covered.
Several state attorneys general have ad
vised state boards of accountancy that, in
view of the Bates case, it is unconstitu
tional for a board to have an outright ban
on solicitation. While the legal posture of
professional associations differs from that
of state licensing boards, the rules of con
duct governing practice and professional
behavior should not be permitted to differ
in these respects.
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Against the Proposal

Legal counsel has not advised that the
solicitation ban cannot be defended. They
have advised only that the chance of suc
cessful defense against an antitrust chal
lenge is slender. As long as there is any
possibility of success, the Institute should
advocate the deeply held convictions of
its members, regardless of cost.
The fact that the rule now would be
interpreted narrowly— banning only oral or
in-person solicitation—should strengthen
an antitrust defense based on “ reasonable
ness.”
The accounting profession is different
from other professions in that auditors
must be independent. Solicitation may
impair an auditor’s independence. The
reasonableness of having a prohibition
against soliciting engagements requiring
independence should be demonstrated—
in court, if necessary.
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LETTER FR O M BOARD O F
D IR E C T O R S T O C O U N C IL IN
SU P P O R T OF PR O PO SA LS

October 9, 1978
To the Members of Council of the
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
At its October 21st meeting Council will
consider two resolutions calling for the
elimination of rule 401 (Encroachment) and
the second sentence of rule 502 (Adver
tising and Solicitation) of the rules of con
duct. Enclosed is a letter and memoran
dum from our attorneys, Willkie Farr &
Gallagher, setting forth their opinion on the
prospects of successfully defending the
second sentence of rule 502 against an
antitrust challenge.
Elimination of Rule 401

The elimination of rule 401 will remove
the encroachment ban from the rules of
conduct. The portions of the present rule
relating to “ shopping” for accounting
principles and expressing opinions on
consolidated financial statements will be
retained elsewhere in the technical litera
ture of the profession. In the opinion of
the professional ethics division and the
board of directors, the encroachment ban
was rendered meaningless and unen
forceable, as a practical matter, when
the membership adopted the Institute’s
revised rule relating to advertising in
March of this year.
Amendment of Rule 502

The second sentence of rule 502 reads
as follows:
A direct uninvited solicitation of a specific
potential client is prohibited.

The elimination of this sentence will
place all forms of solicitation on the same
footing as advertising. Accordingly, only
false, misleading, or deceptive solicitation
would be prohibited.
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The second sentence was added to the
present rule 502 during the discussion at
the Council meeting on September 17,
1977. The professional ethics executive
committee was proposing to issue an inter
pretation prohibiting direct uninvited
solicitation concurrently with adoption of
revised rule 502. There was concern on
the part of Council that the interpretation
exceeded the scope of the proposed new
rule 502, which reads as follows:
A member shall not seek to obtain clients
by advertising or other forms of solicitation
in a manner that is false, misleading, or
deceptive.

Thus, the substance of the proposed inter
pretation was added as a second sentence
to the proposed rule 502 by a vote of
Council and became effective by vote of
the membership in March 1978.
Antitrust Challenge

As you are aware, the antitrust division
of the Department of Justice has been
carrying on an investigation of the AICPA
Rules of Conduct since May 1977. Follow
ing adoption of revised rule 502 by our
members, the representatives of the anti
trust division expressed the view that rule
401 and the second sentence of rule 502
are in violation of the antitrust laws.
Despite vigorous arguments by AICPA
representatives and our attorneys in sup
port of these prohibitions, we were in
formed in early August that recommenda
tions were being made within the Depart
ment of Justice to proceed with a com
plaint against the Institute in federal court
for retaining rule 401 and the second
sentence of rule 502. During the course
of the discussions, we inquired whether
such action would be deferred if we sub
mitted a proposal to our board of directors,
Council, and membership to eliminate the
two prohibitions from our rules of conduct.
While no officially binding assurance has
been received, a complaint has not been
filed to date, and we believe that action
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will be deferred pending the outcome of
action on the changes we are proposing.
The trend of recent legal decisions gives
us scant comfort and considerable doubt
that the second sentence of rule 502
can be retained. The Goldfarb case made it
clear that the professions have no exemp
tion from the antitrust laws. Shortly before
the current rule 502 became effective, the
Supreme Court decided the Professional
Engineers case, striking down as violative
of the antitrust laws an ethical rule against
competitive bidding that the National So
ciety of Professional Engineers had at
tempted to justify on the ground that by
suppressing price competition, it promoted
quality and therefore public safety. In
June of this year the Supreme Court de
cided two cases, Ohralik and Primus, in
which state bans on lawyer solicitation
were challenged on constitutional grounds.
These cases are discussed fully in the
legal memorandum attached, and our
attorneys have pointed out to us that the
decisions will make it more, rather than
less, difficult to defend the Institute’s en
croachment and solicitation bans if they
are challenged under the antitrust laws.
Board of Directors’ Recommendations

In view of the foregoing developments,
the board of directors decided to propose
the elimination of both rule 401 and the
second sentence of rule 502 to avoid
costly litigation that offers little or no pros
pect of being resolved in the Institute’s
favor. In reaching this decision, the fol
lowing factors were considered, not all of
which where given equal weight by every
member of the board, but which, in the
aggregate, impelled a unanimous re
solution:
1. In view of legal counsel’s opinion,
the prospects of a successful de
fense in litigation were deemed too
poor to warrant defending the issues
through the courts. The cost of pro
tracted antitrust litigation would be
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enormous and would pose potential
damage to the posture of the profes
sion in the eyes of Congress and
government agencies.
2. The possibility of waiting for a com
plaint to be filed by the Department
of Justice and then seeking to nego
tiate a consent decree was not an
attractive one in the light of the
current stringent rules governing
antitrust consent decrees and in view
of the negative public impression
that would be created if the Institute
backed down in the face of a com
plaint. It was also recognized that
consent decrees entail legal and
administrative burdens of compliance
over a period of years.
3. A limited ban against direct unin
vited oral solicitation, even if sus
tained, would be so narrow that its
usefulness is open to serious doubt
in view of the present permission of
advertising and other forms of solici
tation. Its value is probably not
sufficient to warrant the expenditure
of money, time, and effort required to
defend it.
4. The prohibitions under question have
been virtually unenforceable in the
past because of a reluctance on the
part of clients to provide corrobo
rating evidence. While it can be
argued that the mere existence of
a prohibition has a salutary restrain
ing influence, the inability to enforce
rules can result in a cynical attitude
toward the entire disciplinary pro
cess.
5. Taking the initiative to eliminate the
prohibitions might avoid the disad
vantages of the other alternatives and
might also yield some benefit from
being seen as a positive step toward
enlightened self-regulation.
In recommending that Council authorize
a mail ballot to repeal the encroachment
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rule and the prohibition against direct
uninvited solicitation, the board stresses
that it does not favor the behavior the
rules were intended to prohibit. The pro
fession years ago adopted in good faith
prohibitions against encroachment and
solicitation as a measure of protection
for the public. But times have changed,
public expectations have changed, and
the law has changed. Whatever argument
for the social and professional desirability
of the rule that can be put forward is un
likely to sustain it in an antitrust proceed
ing, and the adverse consequences of such
a result would be substantial. The board
of directors urges adoption of the re
solutions as submitted.
Sincerely yours,
Stanley J. Scott
Chairman of the Board
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OPINION OF LEGAL COUNSEL
October 6, 1978
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
Gentlemen:
You have asked our legal advice as to
whether the ban on direct uninvited oral
or in-person solicitation, as it appears in
the second sentence of Rule 502 of the
Rules of Conduct, could be successfully
defended if challenged as a violation of
the federal antitrust laws.
A categorical opinion cannot be given
on the present state of the law and the
facts. However, we believe it unlikely the
ban on direct uninvited oral or in-person
solicitation could be successfully de
fended. This is based upon: (1) our view
that the ban must be analyzed as a re
straint of trade under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act; (2) the direction and tenor of
recent Supreme Court decisions in this
unsettled area; and (3) the absence, so
far as we are aware, of a credible and per
suasive body of facts to sustain an anti
trust “ rule of reason” defense.
The Supreme Court decision in Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar made it clear that bar
associations and other groups of learned
professionals are not exempt from the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act. There
fore, an agreement, such as an ethical
rule, restraining competition among those
practicing a profession such as law, medi
cine or accountancy is a restraint of trade
within the meaning of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The only distinction made
between groups of learned professionals
and other groups of competitors is that
agreements by the former, not directly re
lated to prices, will be tested under the
“ rule of reason” rather than treated as
per se violations of the Sherman Act.
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Therefore, we believe the solicitation ban
in the second sentence of Rule 502, since
not directly related to pricing, would be
viewed as a restraint of trade and would
be tested under the “ rule of reason” rather
than declared a per se violation.
The tenor and direction of recent anti
trust and constitutional decisions by the
Supreme Court suggest that the justifica
tions of a restraint such as the solicitation
ban in the second sentence of Rule 502
that will be deemed “ reasonable” are
much more limited and difficult to sustain
than was thought prior to those decisions.
A memorandum discussing the signifi
cance of those decisions is attached.
We believe it would be difficult to de
velop the necessary facts to ground a
successful defense of the solicitation ban.
At the present time we are not aware of
any consistent, credible and persuasive
body of facts that would sustain the rea
sonableness of that ban.
Very truly yours,
Willkie Farr &
Gallagher
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW
To: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants
From: Willkie Farr & Gallagher
Re: Blanket Ban on Solicitation—Antitrust
Considerations
Dated: October 6, 1978
There are four recent Supreme Court de
cisions which we believe bear upon the
views we have expressed in the letter to
which this memorandum is attached. Three
of these decisions are under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu
tion and deal with state bans on advertis
ing and solicitation by lawyers. The fourth
decision is under the federal antitrust laws
and limits the scope of a successful “ rule
of reason” defense.
The direction and tenor of those deci
sions suggests a reduction in the prospects
for a successful defense of an outright
solicitation ban. The Antitrust Division of
the United States Department of Justice
appears to understand this and to have
drawn considerable encouragement from
those decisions in its deliberations on
whether or not to proceed against AICPA.
Similarly, we see no reason for AICPA to
draw encouragement from those decisions
or to undertake a defense of its solicitation
ban based on those decisions.
Constitutional Considerations—
Advertising

In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona the
Supreme Court held that a blanket state
ban on all lawyer advertising was unconsti
tutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and that the antitrust laws
were not applicable to a state. The
Supreme Court did not then decide the
constitutionality of bans on solicitation or
other types of advertising. It did refer
specifically to the possible constitutionality
of state bans on the type of lawyer solicita-

26

tion that might occur under circumstances
suggesting the existence of undue in
fluence, but the scope of the decision in
the Bates case was necessarily limited to
the particular application of a state’s ban
on lawyer advertising. As the more re
cent Supreme Court decisions have made
clear, the Bates decision did not declare
constitutional or lawful any other bans on
solicitation or advertising by professionals.
It did, however, reject various defense
arguments that would likely be rejected
with even less hesitation in an antitrust
“ rule of reason” case.
Antitrust Considerations

The majority opinion in United States v.
National Society of Professional Engineers,
an antitrust case, has been read by one
dissenting justice as requiring a success
ful “ rule of reason” defense to show that
the challenged restraint is in fact procompetitive. The anticompetitive restraint
in that case (a competitive bidding ban)
could not, in the opinion of the majority,
be justified as reasonable on the ground
offered—that it was designed to minimize
the risk that competition would produce
inferior engineering work endangering the
public safety. Whether facts could have
been developed to support that argument
is not clear; in any event, the majority
opinion was to the effect that the National
Society of Professional Engineers would
not be permitted to prove that the public
policy behind the Sherman Act was subor
dinate to the Society’s perception of the
public policy in favor of engineering safety.
Constitutional Considerations—
Solicitation

The two other decisions were in con
stitutional cases not involving the antitrust
laws. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n
the state ban on lawyer solicitation was
upheld as it applied to one of the most
egregious and abusive instances of direct
uninvited oral solicitation imaginable. (Two
minors, injured in an automobile accident,
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were solicited by the lawyer in question in
the hospital in the case of one girl and at
home immediately after discharge from
the hospital in the case of the other girl.
It is difficult to conceive of a comparably
repugnant set of facts occurring in an
instance of solicitation by a certified public
accountant.) The Supreme Court held a
ban on lawyer solicitation constitutional as
applied because the interests of the State
of Ohio in protecting the public against
those aspects of solicitation that might
involve fraud, undue influence, intimida
tion, overreaching and other forms of vexa
tious conduct were paramount. Conversely,
the objectives of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, as they relate to lawyer
solicitation for pecuniary gain and where
speech is merely a part of the means of
such solicitation, were subordinate. In
short, the Supreme Court balanced the
public interest in protecting free speech
against the public interest in preventing
the evils of this type of lawyer solicitation
and held that the latter outweighed the
former in the particular circumstances of
that case.
In the companion case of In re Primus
the Supreme Court held that a ban on
lawyer solicitation was unconstitutional as
applied to Primus’ letter in behalf of an
organization whose objective was to pre
serve civil liberties. The First and Four
teenth Amendment objectives of protecting
various forms of free speech were held
paramount, and the interests of the State
of South Carolina in protecting the public
against remote possibilities of undue influ
ence, overreaching, misrepresentation, in
vasion of privacy, conflict of interest and
lay interference, as well as South Caro
lina’s interests in preventing frivolous or
vexatious litigation and minimizing com
mercialization of the legal profession, were
held subordinate on the facts of that case.
Thus, the same balance was struck by the
Supreme Court in Ohralik as in Primus,
but with an opposite result.
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Significance of Decisions

In order to appraise the significance of
the Ohralik and Primus decisions for Rule
502, it is essential to recognize that those
decisions involved lawyers, not account
ants, and the rules banning lawyer solicita
tion were promulgated by states, through
their courts, and not by private profes
sional organizations such as AICPA. As
in the Bates case those decisions dealt
with the constitutionality of state rules
and not with the antitrust legality of rules
of private professional organizations. The
facts and the law in the two lawyer solicita
tion cases differ from the facts (as we
might best conjure them up) and the law
in any antitrust case that might be brought
on the application of the second sentence
of Rule 502 to certified public accountants.
However, the approach of the Supreme
Court in balancing state interests does
shed some light on the approach that
might be taken by the Supreme Court in
deciding an antitrust “ rule of reason” case.
It is reasonable to expect that a state’s
arguments (defending an advertising or
solicitation ban) rejected in a constitutional
case would fare no better when advanced
by a private professional organization in
an antitrust case.
Application of Precedent to
AICPA Rules

It should be observed that the narrower
the restraint the less difficult it is to justify
as reasonable. The converse is also true.
Indeed, it is the breadth of the outright or
blanket ban on direct uninvited solicita
tion, under any and all circumstances,
even if limited to oral or in-person solicita
tion, that the Antitrust Division challenges.
However, a ban limited to solicitation
(including advertising) that is false, mis
leading or deceptive has been noted with
approval by representatives of the Anti
trust Division. Hence, their objection to
the second sentence of Rule 502 and their

29

apparent approval of the first sentence.
Hence too, our frequently expressed pref
erence for a ban limited to direct uninvited
oral or in-person solicitation as opposed to
a ban on all solicitation. The former would,
of course, be less difficult to defend than
the latter. Not surprisingly, the Antitrust
Division representatives have questioned
the motives of AICPA in desiring to retain
a limited ban— and one so easily circum
vented. They suspect a broader, less de
fensible purpose.
The foregoing discussion assumes the
threat of a civil proceeding against AICPA
by the Antitrust Division seeking to enjoin
the retention and enforcement of the direct
uninvited solicitation ban. It should be
recognized that there are other types of
antitrust proceedings which could be
brought against AICPA on account of its
bans on encroachment and direct unin
vited solicitation. For example, the Anti
trust Division could bring a criminal pro
ceeding which theoretically could result in
fines and imprisonment. The possibility of
such a proceeding being brought, or re
sulting in such penalties if brought, ap
pears extremely remote. There is a further
possibility of a civil proceeding by the Anti
trust Division seeking damages on behalf
of the United States. We are not aware of
any basis for damages being sought in
such a proceeding and consider the pos
sibility remote. Treble damages and injunc
tive relief may be sought by private plain
tiffs claiming injury to their business or
property, and treble damages may also be
claimed by state attorneys general on
behalf of individual residents sustaining
injury to their property by reason of the
unlawful solicitation ban. Again, we are
not presently aware of facts suggesting the
likelihood of such proceedings or of dam
ages that could be established in such
proceedings.
In sum, if challenged, the oral solicita
tion ban would likely be tested under the
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“ rule of reason’’ rather than disposed of as
a per se violation. Related antitrust and
constitutional cases suggest lines of de
fense under the “ rule of reason,’’ although
the decision in the Professional Engineers
case may diminish the viability of those
lines of defense.
Willkie Farr & Gallagher
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